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Introduction
Since the beginning of the history of cryptography, how the distant parties communicate secretly has been a serious issue. Nowadays, public-key encryptions solved the issue. However, public-key cryptographies rely on the computational complexity, therefore improvements in crypto-analysis algorithms necessarily threatens their security.
As a consequence, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [1] has been attracting attentions since it would offer information-theoretic security. At first, the security of QKD protocols were guaranteed by arbitrarily small mutual information between the legitimate users and the eavesdropper [2] , however, it was proven that the eavesdropper could obtain the distributed key utilizing quantum memory [3] . Therefore the study [3] also showed that giving upperbound to trace distance between the provided quantum states and an ideal quantum states expected to be provided with a negligibly small parameter would solve the problem. Ref. [3] and Ref. [4] also gave an interpretation that the upper-bound of the trace distance could be interpreted as a maximum failure probability where the distributed quantum state would not be identical to the ideal quantum state to be distributed, then the interpretation has been widely accepted [5] .
However, H. P. Yuen and O. Hirota have been claiming since 2009 that the above interpretation is incorrect [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . Their claim consists on many parts, but the most important part is that the trace distance does not give such an operational interpretation.
QKD is expected to be used in the real world. Recently researchers are aiming to apply QKD systems to onboard communication systems [11] and medical data centers [12] . However, if there is a imperfections in the security proofs of QKD, the impact on these infrastructures will be very sever.
Therefore, the author of this study has started analyses of these criticisms since the QIT30 conference in May 2014 [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . This time, the author reports that the criticisms are correct and shows that the claim given by Yuen is valid that the security of QKD should be evaluated by the probability for the eavesdropper to guess the secret key.
Security of One-Time Pad
The goal of QKD is to obtain a secret key for OneTime Pad (OTP), which gives perfect secrecy as shown by C. E. Shannon. Therefore, this section shows briefly how the security of OTP is defined.
Let C be a ciphertext, let X be a plaintext, and let K be the shared secret key. Then, the legitimate transmitter Alice generates the ciphertext by C = X ⊕ K, while the legitimate receiver Bob obtains the plaintext by X = C ⊕ K. If the probability distribution of a bit string K is independent and identically distributed (IID), the following condition is satisfied.
This means that the eavesdropper who obtained C has no hints in guessing possible plaintexts X. This is the perfect secrecy of information-theoretical secure cryptographies [18] [19] [20] .
3. Interpretations of the security of QKD 3.1. Definition of ε-security ε-security of QKD is defined as follows.
Here, τ AB ⊗σ E , is a desirable quantum state to be provided and ρ ABE is the actually distributed quantum state. More concretely, when Alice and Bob obtain the final key k A , k B ,
If the ε is zero, we necessarily obtain ρ ABE = τ AB ⊗σ E , which means Eve has no hints on the distributed key. At the same time, it confirms that the distributed key is IID, which confirms the security of OTP. However, problems arise when ε is non-zero.
Types of security proofs of QKD
There are major two types of security proofs. Consider a triangle inequality as follows. 
Here, ζ ABE is a quantum state Alice's and Bob's key agree,
Therefore we obtain 
Here, ε cor is regarded as the upper-bound of the probability where Alice's and Bob's key do not meet, ε sec is regarded as the upper-bound of the probability where the obtained final key is not desirable. Furthermore, ε cor and ε sec are upper-bounded by ε. Now we focus on the ε sec term. There are two types of security proofs. The first type regards the lowerbound of ε sec as the probability where Alice and Bob cannot obtain a desirable key. The second type regards the upper-bound of ε sec as the probability where Alice and Bob cannot obtain a desirable key by converting the trace distance into fidelity. The next section will show the concrete steps of the proofs and reasons why these interpretations have problems.
Security Proofs of QKD and Problems

The Lower-Bound of Trace Distance being
Interpreted as Failure Probability of QKD The interpretation was given in Refs. [3] [4] [5] 21] , then widely accepted among researchers. However, the first concrete proof was given in 2014 by C. Portmann and R. Renner in Ref. [22] . The following is the overview.
To obtain statistical distance from the trace distance, introduce a set of operators Γk. Arbitral operators satisfy the following inequality, ( )
Then, introduce a following joint distribution.
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The last term is interpreted as the failure probability.
Problems with Interpretation of Lower-
Bound of Trace Distance According to [3-5, 21,22] , the last term in (11) was interpreted as "the probability where Alice and Bob fail in obtaining the ideal final key". For instance, the following explanation is seen in Ref. [3] .
"ε security has an intuitive interpretation: with probability at least 1 -ε, the key S can be considered identical to a perfectly secure key U, i.e., U is uniformly distributed and independent of the adversary's information. In other words, Definition 1 guarantees that the key S is perfectly secure except with probability ε." However, this interpretation has the following problems.
The introduced joint probability has the correlation between the actually distributed quantum state and the ideal quantum state which is not actually distributed. It is questionable that there could be such a correlation in the real world. K. Kato precisely discussed about this problem [23] and concluded that
This is what Yuen already pointed out [7] . This means that the right hand side of (12) cannot be even the lower-bound of the trace distance.
The Upper-Bound of Trace Distance being
Interpreted as Failure Probability of QKD The interpretation that the upper-bound of the trace distance directly gives the maximum failure probability of QKD by converting it to fidelity was given by M. Koashi in 2009 [24, 25] . The following is the overview. The ε sec term in (7) has the following relation.
(13) is derived by monotonicity of fidelity F under any quantum operations. Next, we consider fidelity where Eve's system is traced out. 
Compared to (13) , (15) has an inequality with opposite direction [16, 17] , but [24, 25] suggest to choose σ E so that the equality in (15) holds. Then, entanglement purification is applied to tr E ζ ABE to obtain a quantum state near (14) . Let ε sec 2 be a failure probability in obtaining such a state,
Therefore [24, 25] concludes (7).
Problems with Interpretation of Upper-
Bound of Trace Distance Contrary to the proof in Subsection 4.1, this proof seems to have no unnatural assumptions. However, [22] explained that it is not clarified yet that the security of QKD systems in parallel unless
Actually, M. Tomamichel changed his definition of ε-security [26] from (18) to (19) from what he told [27] .
If so, we cannot choose σ E to let it hold the equality in (15) , which means that ε sec cannot be the upperbound of the trace distance. Even if we allow to choose σ E so that the equality of (15) holds, it does mean that the trace distance is non-zero. Therefore, ζ ABE ≠ τ AB ⊗σ E , which means that IID of the final key would not be obtained, or means Eve's quantum system is still correlated to the final key, or both.
Interpretation regarding Trace Distance as
Indistinguishability of Quantum States
There is an interpretation that the trace distance is "indistinguishability" of the ideal quantum state and the real quantum state [22, 28] . Such an interpretation is justified by citing quantum binary decision theory by C. W. Helstrom [29] . The following is the overview. In Helstrom's theory, Alice prepare ρ 0 or ρ 1 with prior probabilities of p 0 and p 1 . Bob discriminates the quantum states with an optimum measurement basis. The maximum guessing probability for Bob is 
If we assume p 0 = p 1 = 1/2, then we see trace distance.
Refs. [28, 22] gave an interpretation as follows. Alice prepares a QKD system which Eve can interact with, or a QKD system with an interface which gives Eve measurement results as if she is interacting with the former system but actually she cannot interact at all. Alice randomly prepares such systems with a prior probability of 1/2, and Eve judges which system is used from her measurement results. If we regard ρ 0 = ρ ABE and ρ 1 = τ AB ⊗σ E , then the maximum guessing probability for Eve is given by (21) , therefore the trace distance can be seen as advantage for Eve to distinguish the two situations.
Problems with the Indistinguishability
The problems with the interpretation are as follows. It is said that Eve's success probability in guessing the correct system is given by (21) , however, this would not give any idea how high the probability is for Eve to guess the correct key. Furthermore, it gives the following problems. Now let us think the original situation of QKD. Firstly, τ AB ⊗σ E is a desirable quantum state but it cannot be distributed, and ρ ABE is the quantum state always distributed. However, in the context of indistinguishability, Alice and Bob have to prepare such quantum states with a prior probability of 1/2. Such a situation does not meet the actual situation of QKD. Furthermore, if they could prepare the system with which Eve cannot interact with a probability of 1/2, then we are not sure why they do not use always, while Eve is sure that the system is always the one which she can interact. This means, the prior probability is very contrived. One more thing, in the quantum binary decision theory, Bob receives the whole system of the quantum state, but in the context of QKD, Eve receives only the partial system of the quantum state, such as tr AB ρ ABE . Therefore, the physical situation of the quantum binary decision problem is different from the situation of QKD.
From above, the indistinguishability interpretation cannot be useful to evaluate the security of QKD.
Security of QKD from Attacker's View
Guessing Probability for Eavesdropper
Ref. [22] derived the following inequality as well, although it did not emphasize its use.
This is the average probability for Eve to guess the correct shared key from her measurement result E. The derivation is as follows. Trace distance generally has the following relation.
( )
Now, introduce a projection operator 
By transposition of 2 -|K|
, we obtain (22) . Note that this derivation is independent of specific protocols, implementations, and procedures of security proofs as long as the security measure is the trace distance.
This result clearly shows that the average guessing probability for Eve can be larger than "the maximum failure probability" obtained from the trace distance alone by the constant 2 -|K| . Also this result corresponds to what Yuen pointed out in [7] .
Meaning of Attacker's Guessing Probability
In this subsection, the meaning of (22) on the security of QKD is discussed.
Ref. [22] gave an example ε/|K| = 10 -24 which would guarantee the security for an age of the universe. Recent experiment [30] claimed that the trace distance of 2 -50 =8.9×10 -16 was achieved. On the other hand, the standard length of the final key is typically about or below |K| = 10 6 bits [26] . Then, 6 10 50 sec Pr( ) 2 2 Pr( | )~2
The "maximum failure probability" interpretation has been telling us that the probability distribution of the final key is 2 -|K| with a probability of 1 -ε sec . However, Eve's maximum average guessing probability in (22) and its numerical example (26) mean that the obtained probability distribution of the final key for Eve is far from IID. Only when ε sec = 0, we can say the distributed key is perfect. Therefore, the obtained keys from QKD systems do not satisfy the condition of the perfect security P(K|E) = P(K) explained in Section 2. This affects the concept of Universal Composability [3-5, 21, 22, 28] by which we could regard any portion of the final key would be statistically independent form other parts so we could use the portion for any use such as message authentication apart from message encryption, however, like above, IID will not be obtained from Eve's view as long as ε sec ≠ 0.
There may be opinion that we could use such keys if Eve's guessing probability is sufficiently small even if the key is not perfect. Therefore we discuss how secure the key is when ε sec = 2 -50 = 8.9×10 -16 [30] . Assume that a QKD system is running for 24 hours 365 days, at the communication speed of 10 9 bits/sec with the final key length 10 6 bits. Then, 3×10 10 keys will be exchanged in a year. Since 2 -|K| << ε sec , the expected number of keys leaked to Eve is 3×10 -5 . This number looks sufficient.
On the other hand, 7.5×10 3 traffic fatal accidents had been reported in 2008 in Japan [31] , while there were 7.9×10 7 cars in the same year [32] . Therefore, one car caused 9.5×10 -5 traffic fatal accidents in average in 2008.
The above values show that the number of potential eavesdropping on one QKD system sees in a year is at the same order of magnitude of traffic fatal accidents one car may causes in a year. If QKD systems spread over the world as explained in the introduction, the number of potential eavesdropping is close to the number of traffic fatal accidents.
Even when we obtain ε sec = 2 -50
, its security level is still insufficient for widely used important infrastructures.
Other problems
Furthermore, Yuen pointed out many important problems in QKD. For example, in Ref. [33] , the trace distance is averaged over exchanged information on the classical channel such as privacy amplification codes, say y. 
Actually, however, Eve always knows which codes were used during the post processes to obtain the final key. She is not seeing the averaged information on the classical channel. Therefore we have to evaluate the individual trace distance appeared in the summation, before being averaged. instead of ε sec . Furthermore, KPA [18] [19] [20] has to be taken into consideration. KPA is a situation where Eve knows some parts of the plaintext Alice and Bob exchange, therefore she obtains the part of the secret key and tries to guess the rest of the key string. Actually, during the World War II, Japan's cipher called purple cipher was breached because some plaintexts were also sent by red cipher, which was already breached, therefore KPA was possible [34] . A more familiar case is the header of data packets on the internet, which are almost fixed phrases therefore Eve may be able to guess. Remember, that the trace distance was introduced in Ref. [3] to make QKD secure under KPA, because negligible mutual information still allowed Eve to launch KPA to obtain the whole key. Under "the failure probability interpretation", the rest of the key string is independent from the known part, so the keys were assumed to be secure even under KPA [22] . However, now we know this interpretation is incorrect and the bits in the key is not statistically independent. On this problem, Yuen already has given some answers.
Finally, Yuen pointed out that we have to consider the situation where Eve may obtain a key which is close to the correct secret key, while Eve knows how many bit errors are there. If Eve decrypts OTP with this nearly correct key, she sees an almost perfect plaintext with some bit errors. Yuen named this issue "Bit-Error-Rate issue," to mean how many bit errors are allowed for Eve to let her read the plaintext [8] . This problem gives Eve greater possibility compared to the probability to guess the exact key in (22) . Even Yuen says how we give an upper-bound on this probability is an open question.
Yuen also pointed out many issues on QKD. The author would ask readers to check other Yuen's papers for more problems in details.
Conclusions
The trace distance in QKD has been interpreted as a failure probability in distributing ideal keys.
However, there has been criticisms that H. P. Yuen and O. Hirota have repeatedly criticized that such an interpretation is not correct since 2009. The author of this study has been treating this issue since May 2014, QIT30 conference. Now, we obtained the average guessing probability for the eavesdropper on the shared key, therefore we now can conclude the claim Yuen and Hirota have been warning was correct because the success probability of eavesdropping was derived.
There is also indistinguishability interpretation on the trace distance, however, we also see that this interpretation is not useful.
The author would appreciate if these problems could be treated seriously to consider the security level of Quantum Key Distribution.
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